Decided on September 18,1953



Govinda Menon, J. - (1.) By G. O. Ms. No. 2310 dated 16-5-1953, the Government of Madras, in pursuance of the powers conferred upon them by Section 10(1)(c), Industrial Disputes Act (Central Act 14 of 1947) referred to a special Industrial Tribunal for adjudication the disputes between the workers of the 65 textile mills enumerated in the schedule to the said G. O. and the management of the said Mills with regard to compensation for involuntary unemployment caused to the workers and while the proceedings regarding the adjudication of the disputes were going on, the petitioner, which is, one of the mills mentioned in the schedule applied to the Industrial Tribunal to summon and implead the Government of Madras as a party to the proceedings. This application was resisted on behalf of the workers and therefore the Tribunal had to consider the application on the merits.
(2.) Two points were raised before the tribunal and they were (1) whether the Tribunal has jurisdiction to implead the Government as a party; and (2) if it has jurisdiction, whether the Government are a necessary or a proper party. On the first question the finding was that the tribunal has the power to summon and add as a party any person whose presence the tribunal deems necessary for a proper adjudication of the dispute. On the second question the tribunal found that the Government of Madras were neither a necessary nor a proper party. The application was therefore dismissed.
(3.) On the first question a recent decision of this Court reported in -- 'P.G. Brookes v. Industrial Tribunal Madras', (A), held that Section 18(b), Industrial Disputes Act necessarily implies that parties other than the original parties to an Industrial dispute can be summoned as parties to the proceeding. Therefore by necessary implication there is vested in the industrial tribunal a power to add any person or establishment whose presence is necessary or proper for the due and just adjudication of the dispute and make them parties to the proceeding. Clause (b) of Section 18, when it speaks of "all other parties summoned to appear in the proceedings" as parties to the dispute, necessarily implies that some persons other than the original parties to the dispute or persons whom the state Government has subsequently added under Section 10(5), can also be summoned in order that the award may become enforceable and binding on those parties also. If the intention of the legislature had been to restrict the scope of the enquiry and the award only to the employers and the employees or similar persons added by the State Government under Section 10(5), then Section 18(b) would be a surplusage because when once the tribunal is given authority to summon other parties to appear in the proceedings. It means there is a wide discretion vested in the tribunal to have before It persons or institutions other than those originally intended by the government or who are added by the Government. In my view Section 18, Clause (b) gives sufficient authority to the tribunal for the addition of parties. It is similar to Order 1, Rule 10(2), Civil P.C., where the Court may, at any stage of the proceedings, either upon or without the application of either party, order that the name of any person whose presence before the Court may be necessary in order to enable the Court effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suit, be added as a party. The view taken by the learned Judges in -- ' (A)' cited above is to the same effect and is binding on me.;

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