K THAYUMANAVAN Vs. DIRECTOR GENERAL OF POLICE

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The present writ petition has been directed against the impugned order passed by the third respondent, the Superintendent of Police, Tiruvarur District in his proceedings dated 3.10.2008, as confirmed by the second respondent, the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Thanjavur in his proceedings dated 12.3.2009, which also have been confirmed by the first respondent, the Director General of Police vide the order dated 11.6.2009, wherein the punishment of reduction in time scale of pay by three stages for three years with cumulative effect, shall operate to affect his future increments, in P.R.07/2008 under Rule 3(b) of the Tamil Nadu Police Subordinate Services (Discipline & Appeal) Rules, has been imposed against the petitioner.

(2.) The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that while the petitioner was serving as a Grade-I Police Constable at Tiruvarur Taluk Police Station, he was placed under suspension with effect from 27.12.2007, pursuant to a proceeding made in D.O.No.1171/2007 dated 26.12.2007, raising allegation as if there was a grave charge pending against him. After sometime, the order of suspension was revoked by another order passed by the third respondent dated 25.1.2008. However, he was issued with a charge memo under Rule 3(b) of the Tamil Nadu Police Subordinate Services (Discipline & Appeal) Rules. The charge memo mentioned only one charge against the petitioner, which reads as follows:-

(3.) Assailing the impugned orders, the learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that when it is an admitted fact that the respondent-Department had not produced the contents of the conversation between the petitioner and the accused Sakthi alias Sakthivel before the enquiry officer, without ascertaining the facts as to whether he had passed on any vital clues to escape from arrest, wrongly found him guilty. The said approach is absolutely unfair and unjustified. It was also pleaded that when the petitioner has been keeping long friendship with the said Sakthivel as motor mechanic, the respondents cannot find fault with the petitioner for having frequently contacted the said Sakthivel. When it is not made known by producing the relevant conversation between the petitioner and the so called Sakthivel, showing that the petitioner alone had given some clues to the said Sakthivel to abscond from the arrest, the disciplinary authority ought not to have accepted the report of the enquiry officer holding him guilty. It was also further stated that the petitioner himself had admitted that he spoke to the said Sakthivel. Therefore, unless a strong case is made out by producing the relevant documents by the department before the enquiry that the petitioner had really spoken and passed on the sensitive informations cautioning the said Sakthivel to escape from the clutches of law, the respondents ought not to have arrived at the wrong conclusion. Now the petitioner, having been imposed with the major punishment, is also going to get affected by getting a meagre pension in view of the present impugned punishment imposed by the respondents herein. In support of his submissions, he has also relied upon the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Roop Singh Negi v. Punjab National Bank and others, 2009 2 SCC 570 for the proposition that the order of the disciplinary authority, as also the appellate authority, being not supported by any reason, is liable to be interfered with. In the present case, in the light of the above ratio, he has further stated that when the orders passed by all the respondents have severe civil consequences, without there being any proper reasons for holding the petitioner guilty, punishing him with the impugned major punishment is liable to be interfered with. It was also further stated that when the report of the enquiry officer was based on mere ipse dixit, the same should not have been accepted by the third respondent. Since the third respondent has wrongly accepted the report of the enquiry officer without there being sufficient evidence to bring home the charge, the endeavour of the petitioner before the appellate authority and also before the review authority has also gone in vain. Therefore, the impugned orders passed by the respondents are liable to be interfered with. One another judgment in Sher Bahadur v. Union of India and others, 2002 7 SCC 142 was also pressed into service to contend that when there was no sufficient evidence to hold him guilty, the disciplinary authority ought not to have accepted the insufficient evidence by giving a wrong meaning to the preponderance of probability. Again relying upon another judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Anil Gilurker v. Bilaspur Raipur Kshetria Gramin Bank and another, 2012 1 MadLJ 978, holding that enquiry on vague charges shall stand vitiated, prayed for allowing this petition.