Decided on August 11,1952



Raghava Rao, J. - (1.) Mr. Ramakrishna Aiyar has raised an interesting point in this civil revision petition. I have after hearing the elaborate arguments of Mr. Kothandarama Naya-nar on the point in question, come to the definite conclusion that this revision must fail.
(2.) The point raised is that on an application for re-adjudication after the annulment of the original adjudication on account of the failure of a composition scheme which intervened, it was incumbent upon the petitioning creditors to satisfy the requirements of Section 9, Provincial Insolvency Act. The petition for cancellation of the original adjudication and for re-adjudication was presented to the Court below under Section 40, Provincial Insolvency Act. Mr. Ramakrishna Aiyar urges that the debtor ought not to have been re-adjudicated an insolvent because the persons applying for his re-adjudication did not prove that the debts alleged to be due to them were subsisting. That such debts were not subsisting the learned counsel has attempted to make out by relying on the provisions of Section 78, Provincial Insolvency Act. The creditors ought to have taken, once the original adjudication was annulled, although at the same time as the annulment of the original adjudication, there as also an order vesting the property in a special appointee under Section 37, Provincial Insolvency Act, steps for the recovery of the debts due to them within the period limited by Jaw, subject, of course, to the deduction of the period from the date beginning with the date of adjudication and ending with the date of annulment and if they chose not to file suits, then their debts would naturally get barred by limitation and, if so, those persons would lose their 'locus standi' to ask for readjudication. If this process of reasoning is correct, the conclusion follows, says the learned counsel, that the debtor ought not to have been re-adjudicated insolvent at all in the circumstances of the present case. Mr. Ramakrishna Aiyar has sought to reinforce his argument by a reference to the several provisions of the Act, which go to show that after re-adjudication, the same incidents as are indicated in the case of the original adjudication become applicable to the case. With some reasonable vehemence, the learned counsel maintained that readjudication is only one form of adjudication and that the same requirements, as have to be fulfilled in the case of an application for original adjudication have still to be fulfilled in the case of an application for a re-adjudication. I cannot say that the argument did not carry some force with it to my mind as I was hearing the learned counsel, and it also seemed to be that being in the nature of a quasi-criminal proceeding, the petition, whether for adjudication or for readjudication must be scanned with very meticulous care with regard to the requirements which have to be fulfilled. But the requirements in question are really to be gleaned from the statute itself, which cannot he added to or detracted from by an arbitrary process of construction. It seems to me that when the statute is thoroughly silent as to the kind of requirements under Section 9, Provincial Insolvency Act, which are to be fulfilled in the case of original adjudication where the statute deals with re-adjudication, it is not for me by a process of judicial construction to indulge in anything like a legislative enlargement of the Act. I feel constrained for the reasons given to repel the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner.
(3.) Mr. Ramakrishna Aiyar has drawn my attention to the decision -- 'Akkayya v. Appayya', 1947-1 Mad LJ 4 and states that this is a decision, which the Court below ought to have relied upon but did not rely upon in view that it took that view being covered by the decision -- 'Kami Reddi Timmappa v. Devasi Harpal', 56 Mad LJ 458 and which favoured the view that it was taking.;

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