V.S. SIRPURKAR, J. - (1.)THIS judgment will govern W.A. No. 1731 of 2000 and W.P. No. 17720 of 2000. The subject of both these proceedings is more or the less identical and both have been filed by the same petitioner. The following factual panorama will help to understand the controversy involved : Petitioner is an employee of the Life Insurance Corporation of India, serving as "Stenographer". She joined this post on 18-7-1991. THIS was a post reserved for the "Scheduled Tribe" candidates. At the time she joined the post, it was on the basis of a community certificate dated 12-4-1990, issued by the Tahsildar, Mylapore-Triplicane Taluk, Chennai. According to the said certificate, the petitioner belonged to "HINDU-KURUMANS", which is a Scheduled Tribe. It so happened that by letter dated 19-4-1995, that is almost about four years after the joining, the Life Insurance Corporation directed the petitioner to produce a community certificate duly signed by a Revenue Divisional Officer.
(2.)IT is an admitted position that the State of Tamil Nadu had withdrawn from all the Tahsildars the authority to issue community certificates, granting the status of "Scheduled Tribe", with effect from 11-11-1989. Therefore, any community certificate issued by the Tahsildar after 11-11-1989 did not amount to a valid certificate and, perhaps, because of this the petitioner was directed to produce the community certificate duly signed by the Revenue Divisional Officer, who was the "only authority" to grant such certificate.
The petitioner, therefore, filed an application on 29-1-1995 before the District Collector, Chennai for the grant of such a community certificate. Even before this enquiry was concluded in any manner, the petitioner received a show cause notice, dated 13-6-2000, from the District Vigilance Committee, Chennai asking her to give reasons why the caste certificate issued by the Tahsildar should not be cancelled. This show cause notice mentions that in pursuance of the request dated 23-12-1996 by the Life Insurance Corporation of India, the "genuineness"(not the "correctness") of the community certificate dated 12-4-1990 was being enquired into. This letter dated 23-12-1996, in pursuance of which the said enquiry was initiated, was also served upon the petitioner.The petitioner gave a reply vide letter dated 23-8-2000 and before even the matter could be finalised, she rushed to this Court by way of a writ petition (W.P. No. 14714 of 2000) for a declaration that the District Vigilance Committee was without jurisdiction and could not have gone into the "genuineness" of the community certificate. The petitioner urged that the formation of the said Committee was by G.O. (2D) No. 18 dated 1-4-1997. According to the petitioner, this Government Order itself was in total derogation of the judgment of the Supreme Court, reported in (Madhuri Patil case). The petitioner had quoted the judgment in extenso in the writ petition and on that basis challenged the validity of the Government Order itself and in the result, the enquiry. The learned single Judge dismissed the said writ petition necessitating the present writ appeal.

The gravamen of the contentions of the petitioner before the learned single Judge was that the guidelines prescribed by the Supreme Court were not followed by the State Government in formation of the District Vigilance Committee as in Madhuri Patil's, cited supra initially the Supreme Court had directed the formation of five members Committee as State Level and had also directed as to who would be the members thereof. The learned single Judge, however, took the view that the subject of the constitution of the District Level Vigilance Committee was dealt with by the Apex Court in Lavetigiri case. The learned single Judge pointed out that the subject of the writ petition was the formation of a "District Vigilance Committee" and not the "State Level Caste Scrutiny Committee" as contemplated by the Supreme Court in Madhuri Patil's case, cited supra. Further arguments of the learned counsel were rejected and the writ petition was dismissed.Before us, Mr. Radhakrishnan, very vehemently contended and again relied on Madhuri Patil's case, cited supra. We have absolutely no difficulty with the principles evolved upon and the directions issued in that case. What is, however, relevant is that there is a difference in ascertaining the "genuineness" of the community certificate and the "correctness" of the claim of the applicant that he/she belongs to Scheduled Caste/Scheduled Tribe. This difference between "the genuineness" and "the correctness" unfortunately is being lost by the learned counsel.

There is undoubtedly a State Level Caste Scrutiny Committee, which is in perfect consonance with the directions given by the Apex Court in Madhuri Patil's case, cited supra, inasmuch as it has Secretary, Adi Dravidar and Tribal Welfare Department as Chairman, Director, Adi Dravidar and Tribal Welfare Department as Member-Secretary and Director, Hill Tribes Research Centre, Ooty, an expert in the field, as Member. Therefore, it cannot be said that there is no such Committee and, indeed, presently we are concerned with the "correctness or otherwise" of the petitioner's claim that she belongs to the "HINDU-KURUMANS", a Scheduled Tribe Community. In that sense, the petitioner is completely confused about the G.O. (2D) No. 18, dated 1-4-1997, which, in addition to a State Level Scrutiny Committee, also formulates a District Level Vigilance Committee. The District Vigilance Committee is given the task of reviewing the community certificates issued by the Tahsildars in the concerned Districts while, the community certificates issued by the Revenue Divisional Officers in the State are to be reviewed by the State Level Scrutiny Committee. It is obvious that the District Vigilance Committee and the State Level Scrutiny Committee would naturally operate in different fields.

The task of the District Vigilance Committee becomes all the more clear from clause 2(ii) of G.O. (2D) No. 18 dated 1-4-1997, which reads as follows :

"The District Vigilance Committee will examine 100 certificates at random issued in the district during the current year. This Committee will verify whether the certificate have been issued in proper form, whether the signature of the authority is genuine and whether correct community certificate has been issued. If necessary, the Committee or the Chairman of the Committee or the Member of the Committee may summon the applicant for personal hearing. It can examine the certificates through the Revenue Divisional Officers. The community certificates issued for the purpose of admission to college, loan from TATCO and loan under the local authority development plan should find a place among those 100 certificates. The certificates regarding which complaints have already been received should compulsorily be verified."

(3.)THE learned counsel very earnestly argues that the power of cancelling the community certificate once granted was that of the State Level Scrutiny Committee. THE argument is completely incorrect as it has been pointed out that it is an admitted position that there is a Government Order in existence whereunder, it is specifically declared that after 11-11-1989, Tahsildar would have no power to issue any community certificate. We fail to follow as to why the concerned authorities could not cancel the certificate issued by an officer, who had no authority to do so and where was the need for formation of a Committee for that purpose. It was plain and simple that the said certificate was issued by the Tahsildar on 12-4-1990 and it is an admitted position that the Tahsildar did not have any such power to issue any such certificate after 11-11-1989. THErefore, on the face of it itself, the certificate must go and any effort on the part of the concerned authorities could not be stalled by finding faults with the Government Order forming the District Vigilance Committee.
Whether there was a Committee or not, once a community certificate is issued, the concerned officers or, as the case may be, the State Government could always go into the "genuineness" of the community certificate. In this case, since the Community Certificate was issued by the Tahsildar after 11-11-89, it could not be said to be a "genuine certificate" at all. Under such circumstances, there was nothing wrong with the authorities to issue a show cause notice to the petitioner for its cancellation. This precisely was done by the Apex Court in Madhuri Patil's case, cited supra, where it was found that the certificate relied upon by Madhuri Patil was issued by a person not competent to do so and it was precisely on that ground that her admission to dental course was also cancelled along with the certificate of status.This is nothing but a desperate attempt on the part of the petitioner to stick to her job which she has got on the basis of a "non-est community certificate".

Once this is an accepted position that the Tahsildar could not have issued the community certificate after 11-11-1989, there would be not even the question of cancellation of the certificate as the certificate itself would be a "non-est" certificate. In our opinion, therefore, the contention of the petitioner that the formation of the District Vigilance Committee was against the principles laid down in Madhuri Patil case, cited supra and, therefore, there could not be any enquiry against the community certificate must fall to the ground. The argument that community certificate once granted cannot be scrutinised cannot be countenanced at all. For 'good reasons', the community certificate could always be enquired into and in this case, there was every reason for issuing a show cause notice. After all the task was taken at the request of the fourth respondent Corporation, when the Corporation found that the certificate submitted by the petitioner was signed by the Tahsildar and that too after 11-11-1989.