J.B.MEHTA, J.M.SHELAT - (1.) This petition is under Article 226 of the Constitution against an order of detention passed against the petitioner. That order was passed on August 3 1964 by the District Magistrate Ahmedabad under sec. 3(2) read with sec. 3(1)(a)(ii) of the Preventive Detention Act IV of 1950. On the same day the District Magistrate passed another order directing that the petitioner should be detained in the Ahmedabad Central Prison and should be treated as a Class II prisoner. The petitioner was furnished with the grounds of detention by a com- munication of the District Magistrate dated August 6 1964 As required by sub-sec. (3) of sec. 3 of the Act the Government of Gujarat gave its approval to the said order on August 11 1964 On August 17 1964 the District Magistrate gave the name of the petitioners alleged associate referred to in para 4(11) of the said grounds and the names of eight of his other alleged associates referred to in para 4 (13) of the said grounds. It would seem that the State Government thereafter referred the matter to the Advisory Board and presumably upon the Advisory Board report- ing that there was in its opinion sufficient cause for the detention of the petitioner the State Government by its order dated September 28 1964 confirmed the said order of the District Magistrate. It is the validity of this order which has been challenged in this petition.
(2.) Mr. Daru for the petitioner has urged three contentions before us:- (1) that the grounds on which the order of detention is based have no rational connection with the maintenace of public order and therefore falls outside the scope of sec. 3 read with sec. 7 of the Act; (2) that the grounds furnished to the petitioner are vague and do not indicate the time and place of the alleged incidents and also the names of the Victims and therefore they are not such as would enable the petitioner to effectively exercise his constitutional right of representation. Consequently the continued detention of the petitioner is not in accordance with the procedure established by law and is violative of Article 21; and (3) the communication of the names of the allegd associate of the petitioner by the third respondents letter dated August 17 1964 is a belated one and does not comply with the provisions of Article 22(5) and sec. 7(1) of the Act which provides that the grounds should be furnished as soon as may be and not later than five days from the date of detention.
(3.) We had had occasion to consider sec. 3 of the Act its scope and also the meaning and content of the expression maintenance of public order as used in sec. 3(1)(a)(ii) of the Act in Special Criminal Applica- tions Nos. 30 and 32 of 1954 which we decided on January 28 and 30 1965 respectively (Digvijaysinhji v. H. K. Oza VI G.L.R. 632). What we said in those decisions was that sec. 3 provided for detention as a puni- tive measure and that the action was not intended to provide punishment for something which was done by the person concerned but to prevent him or intercept him from doing something which would endanger any one of the objects set out in the section. We also there laid down that the preventive detention so provided for by the section was dependent not on a conviction based on legal evidence but on suspicion or reason- able probability and that that being so action taken under the section was based on the satisfaction of the detaining authority and the standard of conduct failure to conform which would result in detention was not objective but subjective. Therefore it is the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority that is the condition-precedent for the exercise of power and not any objective test by a Court. Therefore the question regarding satisfaction of the detaining authority is not justiciable nor the sufficiency of the material placed before it nor the question as to their truth or otherwise. But we also said that though the Court cannot go into the question as to the satisfaction of the detaining authority or as to the sufficiency or the truth of the materials placed before it the grounds furnished to the detenu under sec. 7 and on which presumably the satisfaction of the appropriate authority is formed must have proximate or rational connection with any one of the objects set out in the section. Therefore the question whether the grounds have such rational connection or not with the objective in reference to which the detention order is made is a justiciable issue. If it is found that they have no such connec- tion the order of detention would be invalid for it would be de hors the section and therefore beyond its scope. Therefore if the order in question is made under sec. 3(1)(a)(ii) the detaining authority has to be satisfied that the activities of the concerned person are prejudicial to the maintenance of public order and to prevent him from acting prejudicially to that objective it is necessary to detain him. The expression public order is of wide amplitude and since it is nowhere defined its content has to be gathered from the context in which it is used in sec. 3 and the object of the Act. Public order has in several decisions been equated with public safety and tranquility. All and every breach of tranquility in a sense would involve breach of public order. But it is not each and every such breach of public order which justifies the exercise of so extra- ordinary a power as contained in this section nor is the section intended for punishing a person guilty of every such breach of public order. At the same time as observed in Dr. Lohias case A.I.R. 1960 S.G 633; though the expression maintenance of public order is placed in the section in juxtaposition with the expression security of the State and though the two objectives might to a certain extent overlap they are mutually exclusive and therefore whereas the expression security of the State concerns itself with the security of the State as such involving such happenings as upheavals on a national scale the expression main- tenance of public order concerns itself with the problem of public order of a local significance. The test therefore in every case would be are the activities of the person concerned as disclosed in the grounds such that if left free and unfettered he is likely to act prejudicially to the maintenance of public order ? The object of the section no doubt is to safeguard public order and to prevent it from being undermined or jeopardised. But the mere fact that the person concerned has indulged in criminal activities is by itself not a justification for the exercise of such an extraordinary power unless his activities are of such a nature that they would undermine the maintenance of public order in the locality or the community in which he is residing or operating. Either his activities are such that there would arise a situation in which the maintenance of public order is undermined or jeopardised or there already exists a situation in which even an isolated act would prove dangerous and would render maintenance of public order difficult or place public order in jeopardy. Sec. 3 however is not intended to override the ordinary penal laws or the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts administering criminal] laws and therefore the mere fact that the person concerned is a bully or a habitual criminal and the local police authorities are unable to successfully prosocute him are no grounds for the exercise of power under sec. 3. At the same time a gunda or a habitual criminal is not exempt from the operation of the Act and the mere fact that he can be amenable to the ordinary laws does not preclude the exercise of the power under sec. 3. The exercise of power under sec. 3 would be justifiable provided his activities are such as would if left free hamper or undermine the main- tenance of public order. Therefore the grounds communicated to the person detained and on which the satisfaction of the detaining authority was founded must be such as have rational nexus with the maintenance of public order.;