K.S. Jhaveri, J. - (1.) BOTH these appeals arise out of the common judgment and order dated 25 -7 -2002 passed by the learned single Judge in Special Civil Applications No. 11079/2000 and 11080/2000. By the impugned judgment, the learned single Judge allowed the two petitions and set aside the Notices dated 8 -8 -2000 issued to the respondents herein, original petitioners, u/s. 6(1) of the Smugglers and Foreign Exchange Manipulators (Forfeiture of Property) Act, 1976 (for short, "the SAFEMA") by the competent authority under SAFEMA. The facts in brief are that the respondents herein, original petitioners, are husband and wife. The original petitioner of S.C.A. No. 11079/2000, respondent No. 1 in L.P.A. No. 1053/2003 (who shall hereinafter be referred to as "AP -1, Affected Party No. 1") was detained by the competent authority, vide order dated 21 -7 -1982 passed by the State Government, under the provisions of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 (for short, "the COFEPOSA"). The order of detention was revoked by the State Government on 18 -10 -1982. However, AP -1 was again detained by a fresh order of detention under COFEPOSA passed on that very day, i.e. on 18 -10 -1982. Ultimately, he was released from detention on 23 -7 -1983 on completion of the detention period. 1.1 It appears that, subsequently, the competent authority under the SAFEMA issued notice to AP -1 for initiating proceedings for forfeiture of the property under the said Act on the alleged ground that he was holding properties purchased and/or developed by tented money earned out of smuggling activities. The above Notice was, however, withdrawn. Thereafter, on 26 -6 -1986 and 7 -8 -1986, both AP -1 and his wife, i.e. original petitioner of S.C.A. No. 11080/2000, respondent No. 1 in L.P.A. No. 1054/2003 (who shall hereinafter be referred to as "AP -2, Affected Party No. 2") were served with Notices issued u/s. 6(1) of the SAFEMA. 1.2 In response to the above notice, both AP -1 and AP -2 submitted their replies. However, vide orders dated 30 -6 -1999 and 26 -7 -1999 respectively passed by the competent authority under the SAFEMA, the properties mentioned in the schedule to the show cause notices issued to both the original petitioners, were treated as illegally acquired properties and they were ordered to be forfeited. The properties were forfeited free from all encumbrances in view of the scheme of Section 7 of the SAFEMA.
(2.) THE grievance of the original petitioners before the learned single Judge was that though the properties mentioned in the schedule to the show cause notices issued u/s. 6(1) of the SAFEMA were confiscated and proceedings were over, the competent authority issued another show cause notice dated 8 -8 -2000 on the same grounds for confiscating the properties held by AP -2. The learned single Judge allowed the writ petitions by passing the impugned judgment and order. Being aggrieved by the same, the present Letters Patent Appeals have been preferred. Learned counsel Mr. Anshin H. Desai appearing on behalf of the appellant -competent authority submitted that the impugned judgment and order passed by the learned single Judge is bad in law and erroneous. He drew our attention to the relevant provisions of the SAFEMA and submitted that alternative remedies are available to the original petitioners under the provisions of the SAFEMA and that by initiating proceedings before this Court, the original petitioners have circumvent the opportunity available to them of filing appeal before the Appellate Tribunal under the SAFEMA. He submitted that the original petitioners could avail the remedy of challenging the order passed u/s. 7 of the SAFEMA by filing appeal before the Appellate Tribunal constituted under the said Act. He submitted that in a catena of decisions, the Apex Court has held that when a statutory forum is created by law for redressal of grievances, writ petition should not be entertained ignoring said statutory dispensation. 3.1 Learned counsel Mr. Desai submitted that the High Court should not entertain a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India if an effective alternative action complained of has been taken. He submitted that when a statutory forum has been created by law for redressal of grievance, writ petition should not be entertained, ignoring the statutory dispensation. He submitted that the High Court generally does not enter into a question which demands an elaborate examination of evidence to establish the right, to enforce which, the writ is claimed. The High Court, therefore, does not act as a Court of Record against the decision of a Court or a Tribunal to correct errors of fact and does not, by assuming the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, trench upon an alternative remedy provided by the Statute for obtaining relief. Where it is open to the aggrieved petitioner to move another Tribunal or another jurisdiction for obtaining redress in a manner provided by the Statute, the High Court, normally, will not permit by entertaining a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the machinery created under the Statute to be by -passed and will leave the party applying to it to seek report to the machinery so set -up. 3.2 In support of the above submissions, Mr. Desai has placed reliance upon the following decisions: a. Union of India and Another v. Guwahati Carbon Limited, : (2012) 11 SCC 651 : 2012 (278) E.L.T. 26 (S.C.). b. Commissioner of Income Tax and Others v. Chhabil Dass Agarwal, : (2014) 1 SCC 603.
(3.) LEARNED counsel Mr. Desai contended that the writ petitions filed by the original petitioners was manifestly premature as the competent authority had not taken any final decision regarding forfeiture that could have been challenged by the original petitioners nor was the writ petition, according to the learned counsel, maintainable against a mere notice. 4.1 In support of the above submission, learned counsel Mr. Desai placed reliance upon the following decisions: a. State of Orissa and Others v. Mesco Steel Limited and Another, : (2013) 4 SCC 340. b. Union of India v. Bajaj Tempo Limited and Others, : (1998) 9 SCC 281 : 1997 (94) E.L.T. 285. c. Union of India v. Hindustan Development Corporation Limited, : (1998) 9 SCC 576 : 1998 (100) E.L.T. 14 (S.C.). d. Special Director and Another v. Mohd. Gulam Ghouse and Another, : (2004) 3 SCC 440 : 2004 (164) E.L.T. 141 (S.C.). e. Bellary Steels and Alloys Limited v. Deputy Commissioner, Commercial Taxes (Assessments) and Others,, (2009) 17 SCC 547. f. Union of India v. Guwahati Carbon, : (2012) 11 SCC 651 : 2012 (278) E.L.T. 26 (S.C.). g. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others v. Van Organic Chemicals Limited, : (2010) 6 SCC 222. h. Mahanagar Telephone Nigam Limited v. Chairman, Central Board, Direct Taxes and Another, : (2004) 6 SCC 431 : 2004 (168) E.L.T. 147 (S.C.). i. Executive Engineer v. Rameshkumar Singh and Others, : (1996) 1 SCC 327 (S.C.). j. State of Uttar Pradesh v. Brahmdatt Sharma and Another, : (1987) 2 SCC 179. k. Atul Romeshchandra Desai v. Bank of Baroda and Another, : 1996 (2) GLH 565. l. Secretary, Ministry of Defence and Others v. Prabhashchandra Mirdha, : (2012) 11 SCC 565. m. Trade Tax Officer, Saharanpur v. Royal Trading Company,, (2005) 11 SCC 518. n. Jalaram Corporation v. State of Gujarat and Others,, 1996 (3) GCD 445 (Gujarat).;