AMITA VICTOR AMALRAJ Vs. BACHUBHAI KARSANBHAI BRAHMAN

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This first appeal has been directed against the award made by the MACT (main), Rajkot, in M. A. C. Case No. 375 of 1979 dated 19/11/1980 granting the total compensation in sum of Rs. 54000/ - to the applicant Mrs. Amita Victor Amalraj for the accidental death of her husband Victor Amalraj during the motor vehicular accident which had occurred on 27/06/1979 at about 2-30 p. m. on Jamnagar-Rajkot State Highway on the bridge of River Dodi near Padadhari because of the dash given to the jeep-car being driven by the deceased by the Motor Truck No. GTP 5070 being driven by the opponent No. 2, the driver, and owned by an insured with the opponents Nos. 1 and 3.

(2.) We may now revert to what has been referred to by us earlier. Neither we, nor the learned Advocates appearing on behalf of the parties before us, could overlook, two alarmingly disturbing features emanating from the trial before the Tribunal. One is the prejudice of the Tribunal culminated in the finding that the deceased must be spending away about more than fifty per cent of his income in "eating and drinking outside," a prejudice which appears to be the outcome of the creative conjecture of the Tribunal or an intuition, not repeat, not at all based upon any evidence worth its name. The second one is the silent participation on the part of the Tribunal in the persecution of the claimant widow during the course of the trial. The Tribunals and the Judges prepare judgments either in the cosy chambers or in the overcrowded Court Rooms and many a time it is taken for granted that nobody acts as a watchdog on this part of the Judges' duty. If this is really so, the conscience of the author of the judgment shall have to be more introspective and objective.

(3.) It was indeed suggested to the claimant while she was in the box of the Tribunal, the widow of the deceased and the real victim of the motor vehicular accident, that her husband was having a liquor permit, which suggestion (we do not know how it came to be made) came to be persistently denied by her. A repelled suggestion never assumes the shape of an admission. Suggestion repeated often, even with greater vehemance, remains but a suggestion. Despite this, the said suggestion, on mere repetition, has assumed the significance of a substantive peace of evidence affecting the finding. The Tribunal, it appears, has accepted the oft made suggestion without any basis and though had consciously avoided to rule so in clear words, in fact, has slashed down the dependency loss to less than fifty per cent of the monthly pay of the deceased by saying in the judgment that the deceased must be spending fifty per cent of his income in "eating and drinking outside." Nobody can ever urge that the meaning sought to be conveyed was innocent, namely, that the deceased was required to take his meals outside of the house. If that was the real meaning sought to be conveyed, it could have been done so, very easily and clearly too. The learned Advocate appearing, not only on behalf of the original claimant but on behalf of the insurer also have labelled those words appearing in the judgment as "not in good taste". Not in good taste, definitely, the words are. But our concern goes further and not that for only. The learned Tribunal has allowed his judgment to be tainted with his own prejudices. A Judicial Officer manning the Court or the Tribunal is expected only to record, read and ultimately appreciate the evidence as it is made available. In no sphere of his duty as a Judicial Officer, he is expected or permitted to add to the evidence. If he has got something to add to the evidence, he has got to get down from the chair and assume the stand in the witness box. He has got to cease to be Judge of a cause and has got to be a witness, either for or against a cause. The Tribunal, when has allowed the personal prejudices to play an effective role, we feel that it is nothing but adding to evidence in a cause which was entrusted to the Tribunal for judging.