- (1.) The arguments of counsel appearing for the petitioner in this case had been very brief but most emphatic. He urges that the disciplinary proceedings and the enquiry held pursuant to the charges framed against the petitioner was vitiated in that, there was at least the possibility or the risk of a prejudiced mind entering a finding against the petitioner though the evidence may not support it. This argument was advanced on the basis of Ext. P2, a communication by the Inspector General of Police, the 3rd respondent to the writ application, addressed to the Superintendent of Police, Cannanore, in these terms: A copy of the report cited is forwarded to the Superintendent of Police, Cannanore. It is requested to deal with the Sub Inspector and punish him for misconduct and report compliance.
(2.) By Ext. P7 order, the punishment has been imposed on the petitioner. He filed an appeal against the order Ext. P7 and the third respondent rejected that appeal by Ext. P9 order. These orders are challenged in this writ application. The ground is that it cannot be said that the conclusions reached against the petitioner have been reached without the person holding the enquiry being prejudiced by the direction contained in the communication Ext. P2, extracted above. Counsel submits that this direction was most likely taken as a command by a superior officer. My attention has been invited to a decision of the. Privy Council in B. Surinder Singh Kanda v. Government of the Federation of Malaya (1962 (2) WLR 1153) and the following passage quoted: It follows of course, that the Judge or whoever has to adjudicate must not hear evidence or receive representations from one side behind the back of the other. The Court will not inquire whether the evidence or representations did work to his prejudice. Sufficient that they might do so. The Court will not go into the likelihood of prejudice. The risk of it is enough. I am not prepared to say that the conclusions reached against the petitioner have been reached without the person conducting the enquiry being influenced, in any manner by the direction contained in Ext. P2. I therefore quash Ext. P7, the order of punishment imposed on the petitioner and Ext. P9, the order confirming Ext. P7 in appeal and allow this writ application. I, however, make no order as to costs.;