THOMAS Vs. THOMAS & ANOTHER
HIGH COURT OF KERALA
Thomas And Another
Click here to view full judgement.
Vaidialingam, J. -
(1.)IN this writ petition Mr. N. K. Varkey, learned counsel for the petitioner, challenges the grant of a temporary permit under Section 62 of the Motor Vehicles Act by the 2nd respondent herein viz., the State Transport Authority in favor of the 1st respondent, by its order Ext. P 1 dated 31 -1 -1963 in respect of a route lying within three regions. Apart from the various grounds of attack leveled as against the order that there is absolutely no justification for grant of a temporary permit on merits, the more serious attack that has been made as against the order, is that the State Transport Authority has acted without jurisdiction in granting the permit evidenced by Ext. P. 1.
(2.)MR . K. Neelakanda Menon, learned counsel for the 1st respondent, as well as the learned Government Pleader appearing for the State Transport Authority, the 2nd respondent, have taken up the position that the jurisdiction of the state Transport Authority to grant the permit in question, is to be found in Section 44 (3) (b) of the Motor Vehicles Act.
Therefore, the short question that arises for consideration in this writ petition is as to whether the jurisdiction of the State Transport Authority to pass the order in question is contained in Section 44 (3) (b) of the Motor Vehicles Act. It is needless to state that if the respondents are not able to sustain the stand taken by them, the grant of the permit whatever may be its correctness on merits will have to be interfered with, on the ground that it is one made without jurisdiction. But I will immediately show that it is not possible for me to accept the contention of Mr. N. K. Varkey, learned counsel for the petitioner.
(3.)AS Mr. N. K. Varkey learned counsel for the petitioner has referred me to certain provisions of the statute, which according to him, really indicate that the jurisdiction in such matters is almost exclusively vested in the Regional Transport Authority and as it is his further contention that Section 44 (3) of the statute itself clearly shows that the State Transport Authority is to exercise its functions "save as otherwise provided by or under this Act", it is necessary to refer to some of the provisions of the statute referred to me by the learned counsel.
Copyright © Regent Computronics Pvt.Ltd.