SHANKRAPPA Vs. STATE OF KARNATAKA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS writ petition is by the tenant. The respondents 3 to 10 are the owners of the land in question. The subject-matter of the suit is an agricultural land bearing S. No. 131/2 measuring 5 acres 21 guntas of Kodaganur village, Muddebihal Taluk, bijapur District. It is stated that the petitioner was cultivating the above said land on the basis of 'agavulavani' for a period of 7 years for Rs. 200/ -. After the completion of the same he was cultivating the land on a rent of Rs. 80/- per year. Accordingly his name came to be entered in the RTC from 1967-68 to 1995-96. It is stated that the petitioner had appeared before the land Tribunal and made a statement that he was cultivating the land as a tenant and his statement came to be recorded on 6-10-1980. Thereafter, the Tribunal informed the petitioner that they will inform him of the next date of hearing, but without considering the material on record, the Land Tribunal has passed the order dated 6-10-1980. The learned Counsel for the petitioner has also read over to me the impugned order of the land Tribunal at Annexure-C and contended that it has not considered the materials placed on record by the petitioner properly. While inviting my attention to a copy of the RTC extract at Annexure-A he contended that the entries of this RTC shows that the petitioner was 'agavulavanidar' and it also shown the mode of cultivation of the petitioner as No. 3 which means land is cultivated by a tenant. He also contended that the tribunal has failed to raise presumption under Section 133 of the Karnataka Land Revenue Act, 1964. In support of this submission, he relied upon two decisions of this Court in nanjunda Setty M. B. v Land Tribunal, Somwarpet and another; Narasimha Setty K. G. and Others v State of karnataka and Others. Relying upon these two decisions he contended that the order of the Land Tribunal is clearly vitiated. He further contended that 'agavulavani' is an advance lease. In this connection he has relied upon a decision in Bistappa and others v Puttappa and Others. He therefore, contended that the matter under consideration is fully covered by these decisions. The Tribunal has taken a strange view that the petitioner was not a tenant, which on the face of it is clearly vitiated. He also contended that the order of the Land Tribunal is not a speaking order. With regard to the delay in filing of the writ petition, it is stated that the petitioner has explained the same in para 5 of the writ petition. The learned Counsel for the petitioner has contended that it is mandatory on the part of the Land Tribunal to communicate the order to the parties. Since, in this case the order of the Land Tribunal was not communicated, the petitioner was not aware of the order and he came to know of the same only recently. Immediately he obtained the certified copy of the order and preferred this writ petition. He therefore, contended that the limitation for filing the writ petition should be counted from the date of knowledge of the order. In this connection he relied upon a decision of this Court in R. Venkataramaiah v T. Narayanasastry and Others. He also contended that if the delay is not condoned, the petitioner will be put to unmerited hardship whereas no such hardship would be caused to the other side. In support of this submission, he relied upon a decision in Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag and another v Mst. Katiji and Others. He also relied upon an unreported judgment of the Supreme Court rendered in a civil appeal decided by the Hon'ble Supreme Court on 2-8-1996 and contended that in the absence of the communication of the order by the Land Tribunal, the petitioner could not have approached this Court and hence the question of delay in filing the writ petition will not arise and therefore the writ petition cannot be held to be belated.

(2.) HAVING given my anxious considerations to the submissions made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner and having carefully perused the decisions cited before me, I shall now proceed to consider the question whether this is a fit case for issue of a rule nisi.

(3.) THIS writ petition is directed against an order dated 6-10-1980 of the Land Tribunal at Annexure-C whereby the application of the petitioner to register him as an occupant in respect of the above said land has been rejected by the Land tribunal. It is pertinent to note at this stage itself that the petitioner was examined before the Land Tribunal on the very same day on which the impugned order of the Land Tribunal came to be passed. It is not in dispute that the petitioner had appeared before the Land Tribunal and his statement was recorded on 6-10-1980 and on the same day the Tribunal has passed the impugned order at Annexure-C. The order of the land Tribunal would show that it has recorded the statement of the petitioner in support of his claim and on verification of the oral as well as the documentary evidence placed before it, it was found by the Land Tribunal that the alleged transaction as per lavanikarar' was an 'undubiduva kararu' for seven years, and accordingly, it held that the petitioner was not a tenant in respect of the said land and in this view of the matter it rejected the application of the petitioner. It is essentially a finding of fact recorded by the Land Tribunal on appreciation of the oral as well as the documentary evidence placed on record. In this context it is required to be stated that in paragraph 9 of the writ petition, the petitioner has stated that the statement of the petitioner came to be wrongly recorded by the Tribunal so far as it pertains 1 o that the petitioner was cultivating the land in question on the basis of 'undubiduva kararu'. There is nothing to show that the statement of the petitioner was wrongly recorded by the Land tribunal. That being so, the statement of the petitioner made before the Land Tribunal would show that he was cultivating the land on the basis of 'undubiduva kararu'. There is another aspect of the matter. Even according to the petitioner after the expiry of the said 'agavulavani', he was cultivating the land by paying the rent at Rs. 80/- per year. That means even according to the petitioner, the period of 'agavulavani' expired and thereafter there was a fresh agreement of tenancy of payment of rent of Rs. 80/- per annum. But there is absolutely nothing on record to substantiate the same. This statement of the petitioner would also indicate that he is not seeking registration of occupancy right on the basis of 'agavulavani' but on the basis of the subsequent creation of tenancy at Rs. 80/- per year after the expiry of the period specified in 'agavulavani'. But that appears to be not the contention before the Land Tribunal. That apart the impugned order of the Land Tribunal was passed on 6-10-1980 and the present writ petition challenging the said order was filed after a lapse of 16 years. The explanation offered by the petitioner is neither convincing nor satisfactory to condone the delay of 16 years in filing the writ petition especially when the petitioner himself was an applicant before the Land tribunal. The special feature of the case is that the petitioner had appeared and gave his statement before the Land Tribunal on the very same day when the impugned order came to be passed by the Land Tribunal at Annexure-C. Having regard to this peculiar circumstance, it is difficult to believe that the petitioner was not aware of the order passed by the Land tribunal. It is unreasonable to think that the petitioner himself being an applicant and his being examined on the very same day, he could not be aware of the order of the Land Tribunal. It is also difficult to believe that the petitioner himself being an applicant will not pursue his application to its finality. Therefore, I am of the view that the explanation offered by the petitioner with regard to the delay in filing the writ petition is on the facts and peculiar circumstances of this case appears to be not correct. Hence there is inordinate delay in filing the writ petition. Therefore, the writ petition is liable to be dismissed on the ground of delay and laches. In this connection a reference may be made to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in bhoop Singh v Union of India and Others. Therefore, for the foregoing reasons I am of the view that there is no prima facie case made out by the petitioner for admitting the writ petition at this length of time. Hence it is liable to be dismissed in limine and it is accordingly dismissed.