GYAN PRAKASH GUPTA Vs. STATE OF MYSORE
LAWS(KAR)-1966-8-1
HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA
Decided on August 10,1966

GYAN PRAKASH GUPTA Appellant
VERSUS
STATE OF MYSORE BY ITS CHIEF SECRETARY VIDHANA SOUDHA BANGALORE Respondents


Cited Judgements :-

KARKAL BALAKRISHNA RAO VS. STATE OF MYSORE [LAWS(KAR)-1970-8-1] [REFERRED TO]


JUDGEMENT

Sadasivayya, J. - (1.)These writ petitions are directed against the validity of Part VI of the Mysore Rent Control Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). Part VI pertains to hotels and lodging-houses. It provides for the fixation of fair rates for board, lodging and other services given in hotels or lodging-houses; there are also provisions regulating the eviction of lodgers. The petitioner in Writ Petition No. 800 of 1964 is the proprietor of a lodging cum-boarding-house in Bangalore, doing business under the name and style of Bombay Ananda Bhavan. The petitioner in W. P. No. 971 of 1966 is the Proprietor of a hotel called Shilton's hotel, which provides facilities for the lodging of 65 persons and for their boarding. The petitioner in W. P. No. 972 of 1966 is a partner of a hotel called Lobo's hotel which provides facilities for the lodging and boarding of 38 persons. In these three writ petitions, the petitioners pray for a declaration that the provisions of Part VI of the Act are void as offending the provisions of the Constitution; they also pray for an order restraining the respondent-State and its officers (appointed under the provisions of Part VI) from enforcing those provisions.
(2.)Mr. Suryanarayanan, the learned Advocate who appeared for the petitioner in W. P. No. 800 of 1964 commenced his attack against the provisions of Part VI of the Act by pointing out that except for the definition in Section 3(b), there was no provision for the appointment of a competent authority. This, according to him, was a lacuna in the Act. The attack against the provisions of Part VI was based on four main grounds: The first ground was of a general nature and was to the effect that the provisions of this part are had because of arbitrary delegation of legislative power to the competent authority who is an executive officer. The second is that this part suffers from invalidity as infringing Article 14, in a two-fold manner, (a) because of there being a wide area of arbitrary power in the competence authority to discriminate inter se as between one hotel and another, and (b) because of restaurants being left out of the operation of this part. The third ground is that the restrictions imposed by this part on persons carrying on the business of running hotels and lodging houses are unreasonable and are not in interests of general public and that they fall outside Article 19(6) of the Constitution and are, therefore, illegal. Lastly, it is urged that certain sections in this part, namely, Sections 32, 37 and 39 are liable to be struck down as they enable the competent authority to exercise arbitrary and discriminatory power offensive to Article 14 of the Constitution. Mr. M. Sundar Raj who appears for respondent 2, the All-Mysore Hotels Association (who are interveners), adopts the arguments of Mr. Suryanarayanan. Mr. Jayaram, the learned Advocate who appears for the petitioners in W. P. Nos. 971 and 972 of 1966, while adopting the arguments of Mr. Suryanarayan, has argued with particular reference to the effect of certain sections on the type of business carried on by the petitioners in W. Ps. Nos. 971 and 972 of 1966.
(3.)Before proceeding to consider in detail, the main contentions of the learned Advocates for the petitioners, it would be convenient to dispose of the argument that there is a lacuna in the Act, because there is no independent provision for the appointment of the competent authority. The definition in Section 3(b) of the Act is as follows:
"(b) 'Competent authority' means any officer authorised by the State Government by notification to perform the functions of the competent authority under Part VI of this Act;'. It will be noticed that it is implicit in this definition that the State Government has the power to authorise by notification, any officer to perform the functions of the competent authority under Part VI of the Act. A definition of this type renders it unnecessary for provision being independently made for the appointment of the competent authority. After all, it is merely a question of drafting. As already stated, when it is implicit in this definition that the State Government has power to authorise any officer by notification to perform the functions under Part VI, it is unnecessary to provide any independent section, specifically for the appointment of an officer, for that purpose. In these circumstances, we are unable to accept the argument that in this matter, there is a lacuna in the Act.



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