VENKATARAMAITA, CJ. - (1.)This is an unfortunate case in which the Appellant who is aged about 30 years stands convicted of offences under Sections 302 and 324 I.P.C. for having caused hurt to his mother and death of his father by striking them with a knife on the morning of 24th September 1956 apparently for the reason that the mother tried to persuade him not to injure himself with the knife and the father approached him in horror when there was a cry about the mother being stabbed. The fact that the appellant inflicted wounds on himself, that the mother in fright rushed towards him, that she was stabbed with the same instrument, that on arrival of the father he too was struck and killed on the spot is not and cannot be disputed as there is ample evidence particularly that of his own mother and a neighbour who was present at the time.
(2.)After the incident the appellant threw the knife aside and stayed unmoved. The examination by the doctor disclosed that the father was dead because of the wounds on the vital parts of the body due to external attack, that the Accused and his mother bore injuries on portions of the body, those of the mother being more serious than his own. The appellant did not offer any explanation for his acts but only said that he was not conscious of these. The learned Judge has held that he was capable of understanding the consequences of what he did and is therefore guilty. On the ground that the appellant is of weak intellect and was not actuated by any motive, the lesser sentence of transportation for life has been awarded with a recommendation for relief under Section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, by Government.
(3.)On behalf of the Legal Aid Society which offered assistance to the appellant in conducting the appeal, Sri Srinivasan argued that the conviction is erroneous and urged in support of it that the acts of the appellant are to be treated as those of a person of unsound mind, to which criminal liability cannot be attached and that the element necessary to constitute the offence and found to be made out is not set out in the charge. The latter contention may be first disposed of as it has no force. The grievance is that the charge imputes intention to commit the act and the finding is that the act was committed with knowledge of its effect. For this what is stated at the end of the judgment of the lower Court is referred to but this cannot be construed as a definite expression that intention in the legal sense was lacking. Rather the view appears to be that without motive, illwill or sinister purpose the appellant acted and that he must be presumed to have known the result of it. This is tantamount to saying that the act was intentional as intention has to be inferred from the manner in which a person acts. Learned Counsel was unable to suggest how the appellant is prejudiced by absence in the charge of words alleging that he stabbed the father with knowledge that it is likely to cause death. Nor did he indicate the difference which insertion of those words would have made for the defence. The objection to the conviction as not being warranted by the charge is untenable.
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