- (1.) Is there to be any sense of finality to the decisions of this Court or, does a litigant and his lawyer have the absolute licence to keep on reopening issues after a final determination, is the central question that requires to be once and for all set at rest. Does the law envisage multiple and recurrent stages of argument at the post-final decisional stage is the question that will have to be determined in the light of a so called practice that is to be increasingly current in this High Court under the guise of "being spoken to". While it is accepted that an application would lie to the Court to correct a typographical error that has inadvertently remained in the final judgment or order or to carry out some other minor or cosmetic rectification such as in a case where some little ambiguity has remained with regard to the direction, operative part of the order, time period etc., this facility is not to be misunderstood and misused for purposes of reopening and re-arguing a case and virtually sending the litigation in circles. It is an unhealthy practice and an impermissible one for an unsuccessful litigant to change his lawyer and reapproach the Court virtually for a reconsideration of the case and to couch the application under the guise of one "for being spoken to" or "recalling of the order". The terminology does not matter but the practice requires not only to be discouraged but to be stopped. The statistics for the month of January 1995 indicate that the arrears in this High Court stand at 1.56 lakhs, that approximately 3000 cases were filed in that month and that as many as 90 of* them constitute cases in the above category. As far as applications for recalling are concerned, these come within an entirely different category in so far as they are invariably made in situations where interim or transitory orders are passed which by their very nature, give sufficient justification at times and do qualify for reconsideration, review or recalling. The point arising for determination is in relation to final orders and the contention that is often raised is that if the judgment has not yet been signed, that the order can always be recalled. The case law as far as this class of cases is concerned is very clear and lays down the inflexible principle that if the judgment has been delivered in the absence of a party or his Counsel and if there is valid and genuine cause shown before the judgment has been signed or the office has communicated the order, that it is within the discretion of the learned Judge to hear the party and recall the order if necessary. This provision applies only to civil proceedings as the Criminal Procedure Code prescribes an absolute bar to any such procedure under Section 362, Cr. P.C. save and except for correction of typographical errors. In the case of civil proceedings, the law does prescribe for a review but the circumstance under which a Court will exercise those powers have been well defined and it is now settled law that if material of fundamental aspects of the facts which would have materially altered the judgment including, a decision on a point of law has escaped the attention of the Court despite due diligence of the parties that it may be open to the party concerned to request the Court to review the judgment in such circumstances. The underlying principle in all these situations is that a rule of finality shall apply and this rule shall not be diluted due to a sense of laxity on the part of the Court or a so called practice that has become current. If we are to come to grips with the process of justice dispensation, it will have to be understood both by the Bench and the Bar that time management is of paramount consequence, that a high degree of absolute seriousness and professionalism will have to be attached to the conduct of cases and that one and only one opportunity is provided for by the law at the stage of final hearing and that the Court will not and shall not permit reopening of a case merely because a lawyer has changed or somebody is wiser after the event and wants to canvass some other so called subtle angles.
(2.) The facts giving rise to this situation are of some importance. The petitioner in the original case is the Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation (hereinafter referred to as the KSRTC). Briefly stated, the petitioner had, pursuant to the holding of a disciplinary enquiry, dismissed the respondent who was a conductor from the services of the corporation on the basis of charges of some seriousness. It was alleged that he had not issued tickets to certain persons and consequently, that it constituted misappropriation of the corporation's funds. It was also alleged that he was extremely rude, aggressive and insolent when the incident had taken place, that he had made allegations against the corporation's officers and all the charges of misconduct having been established he came to be dismissed from service. The appeal having failed, he moved the Labour Court by way of a reference and the Labour Court through a judgment running into over 60 pages embarked upon a detailed reappraisal of the evidence and set aside the order principally on the ground that after appreciating the credibility of the evidence, that the charges could not be held to have been established. An order for reinstatement was passed and full backwages were also directed. The corporation challenged the order through the present petition principally on a point of law namely that when the procedure prescribed by law has been followed and an enquiry has been held that it was incumbent upon the learned trial Judge to have first examined the question as to whether the orders passed by the Disciplinary Authority are sustainable and valid in law and if not, to have thereafter enlarged the scope of the enquiry if necessary. The submission was that if the evidence was conclusive and the orders were perfectly valid and correct in all respects including on the quantum of sentence, that the Labour Court ought not to have thereafter interfered merely because in its opinion another view was possible. The basic argument proceeded on the footing that it is not open to the Labour Court in these circumstances to interfere for the sake of interference unless there is valid and legal justification. The petitioner in the meanwhile had been reinstated under the directions by the corporation and therefore there was a stay in respect of the backwages only. I need to add here that at the hearing, the corporation's learned Counsel had submitted that these are cases of seriousness because a good percentage of the corporation's funds are being looted through activities of this type and the complexion of the case does not rest with the individual consideration of whether it was a few tickets worth a few rupees because the offence when multiplied in the case of every conductor would ultimately result in loss running into lakhs and crores. The second submission canvassed was that under the guise of undue sympathy that Court after Court has been repeatedly interfering with disciplinary orders as a result of which it has become impossible for the corporation to take any action against errant employees who are confident of the fact that in every case the Court will either let them off or will show maximum sympathy to them. I do consider that these arguments require to be taken cognizance of because the corporations which otherwise come under criticism because of their financial condition and management do require adequate protection and assistance from the law enforcement machinery and the Court, if some semblance of efficiency and honesty is to be insisted upon from the employees. This Court after a detailed hearing of the petition, disposed of it through a judgment dated 25-11-1994 in which judgment the law on the point has been enunciated and set at rest. Thereafter, in the month of January 1995 even though the petition was disposed of, LA. III has been taken out which is an application for recalling of the final judgment dated 25-11-1994 which had in the meanwhile been signed and had become final for all intents and purposes.
(3.) Adverting here for a moment, I have had occasion to refer to the arrears that are pending in this High Court and the statistics indicate that in the year 1994, as many as 13900 such applications were filed in this High Court at the after-disposal stage for all sorts of reliefs. I have indicated earlier, that except in the circumstances set out which are minimum, that no such application is competent at the post-decisional stage. These applications referred to by me have taken up approximately 10% of the judicial time spent by this High Court in the last year despite the fact that they were in fact not competent, were filed only because some litigant or his learned Advocate desired to make such an application. In those of the cases where the Court grants time, it is presumed that anything up to half a dozen applications can be filed from time to time for extension of time and this is virtually how the administration of justice is being impeded. It is necessary therefore to lay down very clearly that such applications are neither competent nor that they will be entertained.;