MAHADEVAIAH Vs. STATE OF KARNATAKA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The short point that arises for decision in this writ petition is the question as to whether the criminal proceedings instituted against the petitioner and pending before the trial Court should be quashed on the ground of abnormal delay. The brief facts are that the petitioner was working as an Upper Division Clerk in the Office of the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, Bangalore. It is alleged that between June and December, 1986, he was instrumental in an attempt to cheat the Department of a sum of Rs. 32,548/- by making it appear that one Sri B. A. Achaiah had made an application for final withdrawal of his provident fund accumulations and that the petitioner had got it sanctioned through false nothings and representations. According to the charge-sheet filed, there is a further allegation that a class-IV staff by the name of Chaluvaiah had colluded with the petitioners in some sort of cover up action for purposes of ensuring that the evidence of these crimes was not traceable when the, Department desired to investigate into the matter. Both these persons were placed under suspension. An offence under the Prevention of Corruption Act and under various Sections of the I.P.C. was registered against both of them and they are now facing trial before the Special Judge, C.C.H. 6, Bangalore, in C.C. No. 23 of 1989. Apart from an averment to the effect that the petitioner has not committed any illegality and is innocent, what is basically contended is that an abnormally long period of time has elapsed namely over 7 years since the incident, that the charges are not of exceptional gravity in so far as the offences are not punishable either with death or imprisonment for life and that consequently, this is a fit case in which the prosecution should be quashed on the ground of abnormal delay.

(2.) The petitioner's learned Advocate has relied on several decisions, the main one being AIR 1986 Patna 324 : (1986 Cri LJ 1771) in the case of Madheshwardhari Singh v. State of Bihar. In this and several other decisions, having regard to the guarantee enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution, the Courts have in appropriate cases quashed the prosecution on the ground that the right to a speedy trial has been infringed. The petitioner's learned Advocate submits, that this Court must take cognizance of the fact that the petitioner has been placed under suspension since the year 1986 and that he has undergone abnormal hardships. He submits that having regard to the work load before the trial Court, the chances of the case being disposed of in the near future are bleak and that the petitioner has already been completely ruined and viewed at from any angle, this is a fit case m which the proceedings should be quashed.

(3.) It is true that from time to time, different High Courts and even the Supreme Court had intervened in cases of this type where long delays have taken place and have quashed the proceedings. In the Patna case referred to supra which was Full Bench decision of that Court where the delay was of 20 years, the Court quashed the proceedings and had occasion to observe that a cut-off limit of 7 years would be fair and reasonable that if the trial is not concluded within this period of time and the delay has not been occasioned due to any fault on the part of the accused, that the proceedings was liable to be quashed. It would be extremely dangerous to lay down any arbitrary time limit though one concedes that the right to a speedy trial is one of immense importance. The Courts do come across numerous instances where, even though on record there is nothing to indicate that the delay had been occasioned by the accused, that there are other indirect subtle and involved methods adopted to put off the bad day when the accused are on bail and if a mechanical cut off point were to be fixed, it would only increase such malpractices. A careful examination is, therefore, necessary before the doctrine relating to the right of a speedy trial is given effect to, the most important being that it should never lead to a situation whereby a party who contrives to ensure that the trial does not commence or conclude for many years ends up as the beneficiary thereof.