(1.) THE appellant before us, Devendrappa is alleged to have picked up a quarrel with his wife Padmavathi at about 8 a. m. on the morning of 14-5-1997 when he pressurized her to bring money from her parents and when she expressed her inability, he doused her clothes with kerosene oil and set fire to them. Padmavathi screamed out for help and it is not very clear as to who exactly extinguished the flames but the accused ultimately took her to the hospital in a seriously burnt condition. Padmavathi had sustained about 63% burns though there is some difference of opinion with regard to the exact extent as one of the doctors has given the percentage as 40%, but the medical records show that on admission she had given the history of the burns to PW. 9 Dr. Sharma. She had stated that pursuant to a quarrel her husband had poured kerosene on her clothes and set fire to them as a result of which she had sustained the burns. As it was a medico legal case, the hospital informed the police and the P. S. I. PW. 16 came to the hospital. His evidence is to the effect that when he asked the injured as to how she had sustained the burns that she made a statement to the effect that it was the accused-husband who was responsible. The P. S. I. thereafter arranged to get the Tahsildar who is PW. 1 Varadarajaiah to come to the hospital and to record the dying declaration which is Ex. P. 1. The dying declaration is in the handwriting of PW. 1. The fitness of the patient particularly her mental condition has been certified by the doctor PW. 15 and the statement has also been countersigned by PW. 14 the Staff Nurse Anusuyamma. Below all of this, the Tahsildar himself has indicated the time when the statement was recorded and has countersigned the same. The trial Court has placed very heavy reliance on this document as also on several other heads of evidence including the fact that the clothes of the accused namely his pant and shirt which are Exs. P. 6 and P. 7 were found to be smelling of kerosene which fact has been confirmed by the chemical analysis report. The trial Court after a very detailed consideration of the evidence on the law has recorded the finding that the accused is liable for the offence punishable under S. 302, IPC. and has accordingly awarded him a sentence of rigorous imprisonment for life. The present appeal is directed against this conviction and sentence.
(2.) WE have heard the appellant's learned Advocate as also the learned Addl. S. P. P. on behalf of the State and we have also done a thorough review of the record. The principle ground of attack that has emanated on behalf of the appellant is that the condition of the injured Padmavathi who had sustained extensive burns and who hardly survived for one and half days even under medical care in the hospital must have been so very precarious that she would not have been in a condition to understand questions and make any cogent statement. The learned Counsel who represents the appellant submits that in addition to the extensive burn injuries which are excruciatingly painful, coupled with the trauma which the deceased had expressed when the burns took place that the inevitable consequences of various medications mainly pain killers, sedatives and the like would have totally reduced Padmavathi's capacity to a position whereby it would have been impossible for her to either understand questions or make an appropriate statement. A very strong submission was canvassed, based on a number of decisions which have taken these factors into cognizance, that the Court ought not to accept the certificate from PW. 15 Dr. Thippeswamy who has countersigned the dying declaration and given a written certificate on the very document to the effect that the mental condition of Padmavathi was good enough for her to make cogent statement. The submission proceeds on the footing that these statements are mechanically given by the doctors at the request of the Investigating Officer and that whenever a case of burns comes before the hospital or the police, a similar mechanical approach comes to the extent of straightway involving the husband. Our attention was drawn to the statement of the accused under S. 313, Cr. P. C. wherein he has mentioned that Padmavathi used to suffer from extensive bleeding and pain from time to time on a regular basis, that this had not responded to any treatment and that this was the obvious cause for her to commit suicide. The accused contended that he was not in the house when the incident took place, that on coming to know about the same, he came to the house and immediately rushed Padmavathi to the hospital. The last submission canvassed is the usual one namely that the conduct of the accused in taking the deceased to the hospital weighed heavily in his favour as he would not have done this had he been responsible for burning her. In sum and substance, what is submitted is that the accused has been unjustifiably involved and that the trial Court has wrongly convicted him. The learned Addl. S. P. P. has strongly supported the judgment of the trial Court to the extent of pointing out that it is a very long and detailed judgment, that it is a very well considered judgment, that every aspect of the evidence both factual and circumstantial has been discussed, that even as far as the case law is concerned that the learned trial Judge has proceeded on the basis of the well defined principles of criminal jurisprudence and that no interference is called for with the order of conviction.
(3.) DEALING with this head of challenge, what we need to point out is that the finding of kerosene oil on the clothes of the accused is a very strong and incriminating circumstance against him. It is true that one of the contentions raised was that if the accused while shifting Padmavathi to hospital had obviously come into close contact with her that this would explain the presence of kerosene on his clothes. We are not prepared to accept this explanation for the simple reason that when kerosene oil is used in cases of this type, it causes an immediate blazing because it is highly inflammable and within no time, all of the kerosene oil and the clothes get burnt. There is precious little of the kerosene oil that remained after the fire has done its job. Also, reading between the lines we find that the statement of the accused that he was not in the house when the incident took place is obviously false. The time factor was such and so short that there could have been no question of his arriving from some third place and then taking the deceased to hospital. It is very clear that when an incident of this type takes place and there is a commotion in the area that the best type of defensive action even on the part of a guilty party would be to act as helpful as possible by taking the injured person to the hospital. The doctor PW. 9 has very clearly stated that it was the accused who brought Padmavathi to the hospital and we have no reason whatsoever to doubt this evidence. There is no conceivable ground on which it can even be alleged that the doctor would be out to falsely implicate anyone in the case even if such an allegation may be sometimes tenable as far as the police authorities are concerned. Again, it is this very doctor who has made the entries in the medico legal case papers which are to the effect that Padmavathi at the earliest point of time made a statement implicating the accused. This statement is absolutely consistent because the P. S. I. PW. 16 has stated that it was an identical statement made by her to him shortly thereafter and again, about one and half hours later when PW. 1 recorded the dying declaration the same version has emerged for the third timein succession. Consequently, we are unable to accept any of the submissions canvassed on behalf of the accused under this head that he had been falsely implicated and that the evidence has been misconstrued.