(1.) This appeal is directed against the judgment of the Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court declining to interfere with an order of the Central Administrative Tribunal (for short "CAT") which, in turn, declined to interfere with an order of removal from service passed against the appellant.
(2.) The appellant was working as a Branch Postmaster at Donkli, District Firozabad. His services were terminated on the ground that Rs 1150 from the leather bag of Jabalpur Branch Post Office, which was transmitted through Donkli Post Office, had been removed by tampering with the seal on the said bag. A charge-sheet was served on the appellant under the Service Rules applicable to him. A departmental enquiry was held against him in which witnesses were examined in support of the charge, including the personnel of Donkli Branch Post Office, Firozabad Post Office and Jabalpur Branch Post Office. As a result of the appraisal of the evidence led in the enquiry, the enquiry officer exonerated the appellant of the charge, but the disciplinary authority, in exercise of its powers, disagreed with the said findings of the enquiry officer and took the view that the departmental enquiry brought home the charge. Consequently, the appellant was directed to be removed from service by an order passed by the disciplinary authority. The appellant preferred a departmental appeal, which did not succeed. The appellant challenged the order of his removal before CAT, which took the view that there was acceptable evidence at the departmental enquiry warranting the order of removal against the appellant. On this reasoning, CAT dismissed the application of the appellant. Being dissatisfied, the appellant moved the High Court against the order of CAT. The High Court has taken the view that it was not the function of CAT or the High Court to sit in appeal over the findings recorded in the departmental enquiry and that, as long as there was some evidence which was accepted bona fide by the disciplinary authority as warranting the charge against the appellant, it was not liable to be interfered with in judicial review. On this reasoning, the High Court dismissed the writ petition of the appellant.
(3.) We have heard the learned counsel for the appellant and the learned Senior Counsel for the respondent. The learned counsel for the appellant attempted to persuade us that his client was totally innocent and that there was no evidence at all on record which warranted the charge. Despite high-sounding pejorative adjectives liberally used by the learned counsel for the appellant to characterise the findings of the disciplinary authority and CAT as unwarranted and perverse, we remain unconvinced. We agree with the assessment of the High Court in the impugned judgment. In the facts and circumstances, we are not persuaded that this is a case for exercise of our powers under Article 136 of the Constitution. We see nothing wrong with the judgment impugned before us.